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The legal treatment of same-sex unions is part of the wider reflection on the 
position of alternative family structures in modern law. In Greece, the legal history of 
same-sex unions is not related exclusively to the ruling of the ECtHR in the case of 
Vallianatos and Others v. Greece1, nor to the earlier cases of marriage on the island of 
Tilos2. In relation to marriage, the question has been posed to science and the case-
law as to whether same-sex marriage may be regarded as valid under the applicable 
legislation,from an interpretive point of view, the prevalent reply to which appears to 
be (correctly in my view) in the negative3.On the other hand, it may be possible, albeit 
unrealistic under the circumstances, for the Greek legislator to extend the capacity to 
conclude marriage to same-sex couples as well, in which case the consequences of the 
legislator’s choice for family law and the legislation on medically assisted 
                                                          
1Judgment of 7.11.2013, Cases29381/09 and 32684/09, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int. Translation into 
Greek, see elawyer.blogspot.gr/2013/11/blog-post_10.html. 
2 Note that two same-sex marriages took place in June 2008 at the Town Hall of the island of Tilos 
(two men and two women). By order of the Supreme Court Prosecutor G. Sanidas, the Public 
Prosecutor’s District Office at the Court of First Instance of Rhodes lodged an action for annulment and 
the marriages in question were declared null by the Court of First Instance [Rulings 114 and 115/2009, 
Efarmoges Astikou Dikaiou (ΕφΑΔ) (Hellenic Law Review)2009, 690], whereas the appeal of the 
persons involved was rejected (Dodecanese Court of Appeal 83/2011) and the mayor who had 
officiated the weddings was accused of breach of duty. The locus standi of the public prosecutor to 
bring an action for declaring a marriage invalid (see Article 608 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Article 
1378of the Civil Code) has been questioned, see Papachristou, Observations on the Ruling of the Court 
of First Instance of Rhodes 114/2009, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2009, 617 
(620). Papazisi, Observations on the same ruling, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 
2009, 621, 622. See Panagopoulos, Comment on the Ruling of the Court of First Instance of Rhodes 
114/2009, Digesta[Hellenic Law Review] 2009, 176 et seq. 
3 See, indicatively, Kounougeri-Manoledaki Family Law, 5th edition (2012) ΙΙ, 61. Kotzampasi, 
Succession between spouses (2007), 37 et seq. Papachristou, A Manual of Family Law,3 (2005), 
37.Spyridaki, Family Law (2006), 138.Stathopoulou/Stampelou, in the Civil Code by 
Georgiadis/Sathopoulos, 2nd edition (2007) Introd. Art. 1350-1371 par. 2, 3, 4.N. Georgiadis, in Short 
Interpretation of the Civil Code by Georgiadis, Articles 1350-1352 par. 5. Vlachopoulos,The problems 
associated with same-sex civil unions, in Mpoti/Koutnatzi (ed.), Bioethical reflections (2014), 645 et 
seq. On the contrary, Vidalis, The constitutional dimension of power in marriage and in family (1996), 
72 et seq. Papazisi, Observations on the Ruling of the Court of First Instance of Rhodes 114/2009, 
Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2009, 621. Papadopoulou, Same-sex marriage: An 
attempt of legal and legislative assessment, Dikaiomata tou Anthropou [Hellenic Law Review] 2008, 
405 et seq. Mallios, Legal establishment of same-sex cohabitation: Greek reality and European 
dimension (ECHR), http://www.constitutionalism.gr. Cf. Panagopoulos, Comment on the Ruling of the 
Court of First Instance of Rhodes 114/2009, Digesta [Hellenic Law Review] 2009, 176 et seq. 
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reproduction should be discussed. However, it would be more realistic to establish 
same-sex registered partnership instead of marriage, and this is how I will start my 
presentation.  
In particular, by means of Law 3719/2008, the Greek legislator provided for 
the establishment of civil unions, other than marriage, in the form of “registered 
partnerships”. There has been justified criticism against the generally faint regulation 
of registered partnership, which, in my view, reflects a (deliberate or not) confusion in 
relation to its concept and purpose. It is clear from the explicit references in the 
Explanatory Memorandum that the legislator has the - obsolete in my opinion - belief 
that in order to protect the significant social institution of marriage its coexistence 
with other forms of institutionalized interpersonal relationships must be avoided. In 
other words, “alternatives” to marriage must either not be foreseen or, if so, they must 
not be correlated to marriage and its institutional dimension, so as not to have a 
competitive effect thereon. However, excluding any kind of institutional dimension 
from regulated family relationships is a rather unattainable goal4- or even an incorrect 
one. In addition, in support of the previous argument, this regulation is not so different 
from that of marriage, as regards the relationship of partners with their common 
children. As a matter of fact, the presumption of paternity is also applicable to this 
case and, according to the most correct view on the matter, a couple under registered 
partnership is regarded as equal to a married couple under the legislation on medically 
assisted reproduction (for instance, there is no need for partners to sign a notarial 
consent, given that a simple private act would suffice, as is the case for married 
couples). 
This equivalence in kinship, between registered partnership and marriage is 
inextricably linked to the well-known and much-discussed characteristic of registered 
partnership, namely that it is only available for different-sex couples. This is an 
element that demonstrates not only the weakness of the legislation but also its 
irrationality, as different-sex couples may either conclude marriage or enter a 
registered partnership, that is, they have an array of opportunities which could be 
argued to bring them at the verge of legal luxury, while same-sex couples are unable 
to legally establish their relationship in any way whatsoever, being equally deprived, 
as we will see later on, of the chance to have common children. A reverse provision 
                                                          
4 See, Papachristou, in Papachristou/Koumoutzi/Tsouka The Registered Partnership. Interpretive 
Guide to Articles 1-13 of Law 3719/2008 (2009), Introductory remarks par. 7. 
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would make more sense, as is the case for German5 or English6 Law (and the law of 
many other countries7), according to which registered partnership is exclusively 
intended for same-sex couples, to the extent that they are excluded from the ability to 
wed8. It is characteristically stated in the judgment of the ECtHR in Vallianatos and 
Others v. Greece9 that Greece and Lithuania are the only countries to have this 
paradox, i.e. a form of registered partnership designed solely for different-sex couples. 
Both the Scientific Service of the Hellenic Parliament10 and the National Human 
Rights Committee11 had stressed that the discriminatory treatment of same-sex unions 
is not adequately justified by the provisions and the Explanatory Report of Law 
3719/200812. The same fact was pointed out by most parties of the opposition during 
the passage of the Law13. This was followed by the ECtHR ruling on case Vallianatos 
v. Greece, which, taking account of the case-law of the Court in similar cases, was no 
legal surprise let alone a paradox. So far, Greece has failed to comply with the Court’s 
ruling, giving rise to (162) new applications lodged in respect of the same issue before 
the Court of Justice in Strasbourg. On the other hand, a draft law entitled 
“Amendment to Family Law Provisions”14 has been submitted15 since 2010 to the 
Ministry of Justice by the special legislative drafting committee chaired by Professor 
E. Kounougeri-Manoledaki from the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, which 
                                                          
5Gesetzüber die eingetrageneLebenspartnerschaft, commonly referred to as Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz 
(LPartG), 2001. 
6Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
7 Such as Croatia, the Czech Republic, Germany, Sloveniaand Switzerland (cf. Mallios, Legal 
establishment of same-sex cohabitation: Greek reality and European dimension (ECHR), 
http://www.constitutionalism.gr). 
8 This is no longer the case for English law. As of July 2013 (in effect from March 2014) same-sex 
marriage was also recognized in the United Kingdom, with the exception of N. Ireland. [Marriage 
(Same Sex Couples) Act 2013].  
9Par. 25. 
10Observations on Article 1 Law 3719/2008, hellenicparliament.gr/legislative work/search/report of the 
scientific council. 
11 Observations of the National Human Rights Committee on the Draft Law ‘Reforms for Family, 
Children and the Society”, 2008, www.nhcr.gr 
12 It is further noted in the rulings that declared null the marriages of Tilos [Court of First Instance of 
Rhodes 114, 115/2009, Efarmoges Astikou Dikaiou(Hellenic Law Review)2009, 690], as an indirect 
acknowledgement of the fact that the legislation on registered partnership is insufficient: ‘bearing in 
mind that the Greek legislation is an organism which grows and evolves in order to reflect social reality 
and modern requirements… it would be safer to proceed to a legislative resolution of this issue 
[meaning same-sex civil unions] and, in particular, the issue of registered partnership’.  
13Minutes of the Hellenic Parliament, 2nd Session of the 12th Period (IB) (6.10.2008-3.9.2009), vol. A, 
p. 323, vol. B, p. 1406-1442, 1577-1606, vol. C, p. 2006. 
14 For an extract of the Draft Law and its Explanatory Memorandum (in relation to the proposed 
amendments to registered partnership), see Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ, Annex (p. 
623 et seq.). 
15On 17.12.2010. 
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provides for (a) extending registered partnership to same-sex couples;16 (b) applying 
all legal provisions regulating the relationship of married couples to registered 
partnership, mutatis mutandis;17 (c) granting the right to adopt to couples in registered 
partnership, provided that the person adopted is an adult18,19. However, the draft does 
not contain any specific provisions on medically assisted reproduction. A new 
legislative drafting committee has already been formed at the Ministry of Justice 
(December 2014), in order to revive the inquiry on extending registered partnership to 
same-sex couples. 
Although in Greece what is obvious is often overlooked, I would like to think 
that at some point Greece will comply with the case-law of the ECtHR by extending 
registered partnership to same-sex couples. It would be very interesting to consider 
the specific implications of such compliance and the way it can be reflected in the 
field of medically assisted reproduction. This is because very often “reforms” remain 
general declarations. 
At the beginning of this review, it would be useful to highlight the scope of 
implementation of the ruling on case Valianatos20: The applicants’ complaint was not 
related to a general and abstract obligation on the Greek State to provide for a form of 
legal recognition in domestic law for same-sex relationships, but to the fact that Law 
3719/2008 provides for civil unions of different-sex couples only, thereby excluding 
same-sex couples from its scope. In other words, the Greek State was not sentenced 
for failing to comply with any positive obligation imposed by the Convention (i.e. to 
establish a same-sex civil union), but for introducing a distinction, by virtue of Law 
3719/2008, which constitutes a discrimination. On the contrary, with reference to the 
same ruling, when a legal provision also applies to different-sex couples it does not 
constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation against same-sex couples. 
                                                          
16 Article 1 of the Draft Law contained no reference to gender or gender difference between partners. 
17 Article 35 of the Draft Law provided for an additional paragraph two to Article 13 of Law 
3719/2008, stipulating that: “The provisions of the Civil Code referring to the relations of spouses, as 
well as the provisions pertaining to public service, labor, social insurance, pension and tax legislation in 
relation to spouses shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to the members of a registered partnership, unless 
otherwise stipulated in the present Law or in any other law”. 
18 Article 24 of the Draft Law provided for an amendment to Article 1579 of the Civil Code, as follows: 
“Adult adoption. Adult adoption shall be permitted only when the adopter is the spouse or registered 
partner of the adopted person’s parent, or if the said person has been foster parent to the adopted person 
for at least one year. In this last case, the same person may be adopted by two spouses or registered 
partners". 
19 For comments on the proposals made by the draft see Panagopoulos, Gender difference in marriage 
and cohabitation, Etairia Dikastikon Meleton [Society of Judicial Studies], Contemporary Trends in 
Family Law (2013), 62 et seq. 
20Par. 75. 
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Therefore, Greece would be able to comply with the ruling of the ECtHR by 
simply extending registered partnership to same-sex civil unions. However, this 
would keep in place - and extend to same-sex couples- one of the most significant 
problems of the applicable legislation with regard to registered partnerships, namely 
whether partners under registered partnership are assimilated to spouses in their 
relationship with each other. Here, I would like to remind you of my introduction on 
the relationship between registered partnership and marriage, as well as of the fact 
that the original draft of Law 3719/2008 provided for the extension of legal provisions 
on marriage to registered partnership, mutatis mutandis;21 however, the relevant 
provision was never included in the text of the Law. Though inconsistent with the 
statements of the Explanatory Memorandum as to the distinction between registered 
partnership and marriage, these provisions would be at least able to resolve certain 
problems of interpretation and enforcement, which Law 3719/2008 itself and the 
inexistent internal rationale of registered partnership are unable to address22. 
Therefore, it would be more appropriate for the Greek legislator to seize the 
opportunity of reforming the institution as a whole, so that the scope of the relations 
between partners may have the same legal consequences as marriage, or at least 
similar consequences, to a significant extent.  
 A perhaps more adequate alternative proposal would be to create two types of 
registered partnership: a “strong” partnership, which would be equivalent to marriage, 
from a regulatory aspect; and a rather “flexible” partnership, similar to the currently 
applicable registered partnership under Law 3719/2008. The existence of different 
forms of the same institution, which vary as to their legal consequences, is not an 
unknown phenomenon to family law, as demonstrated by the example of adoption. In 
our legal system, as in others, adoption is divided into “full” and “simple”, depending 
on the extent and intensity of the artificial kinship created23. Similar or other terms 
may be used for making a similar distinction within the institution of formal or 
                                                          
21 See, the wording of this provision in Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ 593. 
22Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ 594.Papachristou, in Papachristou/Koumoutzi/Tsouka, 
ibid. Introductory Remarks, No 5. 
23 In Greek law, there is a distinction in legal consequences between the adoption of minors, which is 
“full” (see Articles 1561-1568 of the Civil Code) and the adoption of adults, which is “simple” (see 
Articles 1584-1587 of the Civil Code). Under French law, the distinction between “adoption simple/ 
adoption plenière” is not exclusively related to the age of the adopted person, in the sense that 
“adoption simple” is possible for all adopted persons (see Article 360 of the French Civil Code). 
Regarding the terminology and specific content of this distinction, See Fountedaki, Adoption. Law 
2447/1996, its amendments and enforcement (2010), 74. 
                                                 Medically assisted reproduction 
 
242 
registered partnership. Under this arrangement, it is expected that same-sex couples 
will opt for the first version of “strong” partnership, while different-sex couples will 
opt for the second version24.  
This legislative proposal concerns the relationship between partners, as to 
which an equivalence with married spouses must be established, at least in one form 
of registered partnership. Additional issues arise in relation to the partners’ children. 
As a matter of fact, there is nothing to prevent a member of the couple from having a 
child (by natural or assisted procreation25) or from adopting one26 and then raising it 
along with his/her partner. However this will be a de facto and not a de jure family. 
The issue pertains to the ability of same-sex partners to have common children, 
either through adoption or by medically assisted procreation.  
The following must be noted in relation to the particular field of medically 
assisted procreation: Under legislation in force on assisted procreation, having 
common children is not possible for same-sex couples and this is irrelevant to the fact 
that those couples are not permitted to enter a registered partnership. In addition, in 
the case of male couples, it would be impossible even for only one member of the 
couple to have children, as demonstrated by the case-law in respect of the ability of 
single men to have children, by applying, mutatis mutandis, the provisions on ovary 
donation and surrogacy27. Furthermore, it is also impossible for female couples to 
                                                          
24 It is presumed that different-sex couples will have no reason to select the first form of registered 
partnership (the regulatory equivalent to marriage), given that they can conclude marriage. However, 
there are cases where different-sex couples simply reject the powerful symbolism of marriage (i.e. they 
actually want marriage under another name). 
25 The ability of men without a female spouse or partner to have children by medically assisted 
reproduction is analyzed later on in this paper. 
26 In case of an adoption of an adult, in accordance with the terms of Article 1579 of the Civil Code. 
27According to the view that has prevailed in the relevant case-law (Athens Court of Appeal 3357/2010 
NOMOS [Hellenic Law Data Base]) (which is more correct in my opinion, See Papadopoulou-
Klamari, Kinship.Establishment - Registration - Protection, 2010, 223 et seq. Kotzampasi, Gender 
equality and private autonomy, 2011, 144, 156, 196.Vlachopoulos, The right to have children via 
surrogacy for single men, in Kanellopoulou-Mpoti/Panagopoulou-Koutnatzi [ed.], Medical liability and 
Bioethics. Modern approaches and future perspectives, 2014, 187 et seq.). However, there were 
previous rulings to the contrary by the courts of first instance and the State Legal Council, see Athens 
Single-Member Court of First Instance 2827/2008, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 
2009 817 [which was quashed by the aforementioned ruling of the Court of Appeal]. Athens Single-
Member Court of Appeal 13707/2009,Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2011 267. 
Opinion of the State Legal Council 261/2010, Efarmoges Astikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 
2010 1205), the provisions on surrogacy (Civil Code 1458, 1464) do not cover (neither from an 
interpretative aspect) men without a spouse or female partner, wishing to have a child. The opposite 
view is probably predominant in theory, see, for instance Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ 
56 et seq. Papachristou, Observations on the Ruling of the Single-Member Court of First Instance of 
Athens 2827/2008, Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2009, 818. Spyridakis, 
Artificial Reproduction (2006), 32.Koumoutzis, in the Civil Code by Georgiadis/Stathopoulos, Articles 
1457-1458 par. 79. Koumoutzis, Artificial reproduction for single unmarried men, Chronika Idiotikou 
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have common children via medically assisted procreation. If one of the two women 
gives birth to a child using artificial reproduction methods, the establishment of 
kinship between the child and the other woman-partner of the mother is not provided 
by law, as is the case for the presumption of paternity in relation to the husband or 
male partner in registered partnership. In addition, automatic voluntary 
acknowledgment of the child by giving one’s consent to assisted reproduction 
[Articles 1456 and 1475(2) of the Civil Code] again applies only in relation to male 
partners (without a registered partnership) of the assisted women. In general terms, 
the presumption and acknowledgment of paternity under Greek law are concepts 
related exclusively to paternity. Nor would the adoption of a partner’s child by the 
other partner be a solution in such cases, as it does not lead to an establishment of 
kinship between the child and both partners. 
This situation cannot be automatically resolved even if registered partnership 
is extended, under any form it may take in the future, to same-sex couples. It would 
actually seem reasonable to argue that, even then, this will not be a case of legal gap 
to be covered by the interpretative analogy; the legislator’s choice to limit the right to 
medically assisted reproduction only to spouses, different-sex couples and women 
without a spouse or partner was intentional and deliberate when adopting Law 
3089/2002. This arises from the preparatory works and the Explanatory Report of 
Law 3089/2002. This choice was not linked to the institutionalization of non-marital 
cohabitation; said institutionalization did not exist in 2002, but different-sex couples 
in cohabitation were given the possibility to have common children through medically 
assisted procreation. Nor can it be argued that, in 2002, the legislator was unaware of 
the social reality of same-sex civil unions. Therefore, the legislator opted for 
structuring the provisions on medically assisted reproduction so that it may apply only 
to different-sex couples, married or not. The fact that after the adoption of Law 
3719/2008 [different-sex] partners under registered partnership are assimilated to 
spouses, in the field of medically assisted reproduction,28 is due to the fact that the 
presumption of paternity applies to registered partnership as it does to marriage. 
Assimilating, under the same argument, same-sex partners with spouses in the field of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2011, 316. Rethymniotaki, Same-sex couples and medically assisted 
reproduction, Medical Law and Bioethics Publications 18 (2014), 147 et seq., 174 et seq. 
28Mainly regarding the issue of the formalities of consent under Article 1456 of the Civil Code. See 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid., ΙΙ 19. Trokanas, Human Reproduction. Private autonomy 
and its limits (2011), 247. Peraki, in Ap. Georgiadis, Short Interpretation of the Civil Code ΙΙ, Article 
1456 No 15. On the contrary, See, Papadopoulou-Klamari, Kinship, ibid. 175, 176. 
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medically assisted reproduction, when, in the future, the former are allowed to enter a 
registered partnership, would be a petition principii. In conclusion, extending 
registered partnership to same-sex couples would not automatically mean that such 
couples would be covered by the provisions on having common children via 
medically assisted procreation, as an additional legislative intervention would be 
required. 
If this is the case (namely the inability of same-sex couples to have common 
children via MAP, which would continue to apply in principle even after they are 
given the ability to enter a registered partnership), does it constitute a violation of the 
principle of equality and Article 14 of the ECHR (in conjunction with Article 8)? The 
answer should probably be in the negative. According to the view which I find more 
correct, medically assisted procreation is, under Greek law29, a therapeutic medical 
practice30, aimed at overcoming the inability, for medical reasons, of natural 
procreation (namely the biological process of having children). From this stand point, 
the case of different-sex couples is not the same as same-sex couples and the case of a 
woman who cannot become pregnant for medical reasons is not the same as that of a 
man, who is unable to become pregnant by definition31. I do not wish to argue that the 
therapeutic approach of MAP is the only valid approach. However, I believe that it 
                                                          
29 Based on the rationale of the general restrictions set out in Articles 1455 of the Civil Code, 1, 2 and 4 
of Law 3305/2005, See, in that regard Fountedaki, Human reproduction and civil medical 
responsibility (2007), 162 et seq. 
30Namely, an action which is necessary and appropriate for maintaining or restoring the patient’s health 
or for avoiding its deterioration or for addressing by any other means a non-reversible health problem 
faced by the patient. In other words, therapeutic practice relates to medical indication (medizinische 
Indikation) and necessity (necessité thérapeutique)·See Fountedaki, Medical Civil Liability. General 
introduction - Dogmatic and judicial-political view - Fundamental concepts (2003), 224 et seq. In 
medically assisted reproduction, medical necessity lies in the inability to have children in a natural way 
or in avoiding the transmission of serious illnesses to the child, and it is explicitly provided by law as a 
condition for using the relevant methods (See Article 1455 of the Civil Code), See, indicatively 
Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ 5 et seq. and for more details Trokanas, ibid., 166 et seq. 
Regarding the classification of MAP methods as therapeutic practices see Fountedaki, Human 
reproduction, ibid., 151 et seq. 
31 This clear and justified distinction is clouded, in my opinion, by the prevailing view that the use of 
MAP methods falls automatically within the scope of the general “right of  procreation”, which relies 
on the right to freedom of personal development as established by the Greek Constitution [Article 5(1) 
of the Constitution] or, according to other views, on Articles 9(1)(2), 21(1) of the Constitution. See, 
indicatively, Athens Single-Member Court of First Instance 13707/2009 NOMOS [Hellenic Law Data 
Base]. Multi-Member Court of First Instance of Chania 226/2009 Chronika Idiotikou Dikaiou [Hellenic 
Law Review] 2011, 182. Explanatory Reports for Laws 3089/2002 and 3305/2005, points I.4 of Article 
1, respectively. Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid., ΙΙ 5. Kriari-Katrani, Biomedical 
developments and Constitutional law (1994), 70. Papachristou, Lex dei, lex populi? Chronika Idiotikou 
Dikaiou [Hellenic Law Review] 2002, 674. Vidalis, Life without a person. The Constitution and the use 
of human genetic material (2003), 92 et seq. Trokanas, ibid. 91 et seq. (and citations therein), 95 et seq. 
In contrast, Koutsoumpinas, Constitutional preamble to a bioethics matter, Dioikitiki Diki [Hellenic 
Law Review], 1994, 1089 et seq. 1096. 
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has a clear legal basis under the applicable law, which, as a consequence, would have 
to change if MAP was to be regarded as something else, namely as the expression of 
the right of all persons to have children. In conclusion, the Greek legislator is neither 
required to nor prevented from extending, via various adjustments to the law of 
kinship, which would be impossible to deduce by interpretation, the permissibility and 
consequences of the application of medically assisted procreation to same-sex couples 
with or without a registered partnership (when they are allowed to enter one).  
The question that follows is whether the answers to the issue at hand would be 
different or not if registered partnership, which in the future would cover same-sex 
couples, was to allow for the legal assimilation of partners with spouses or if, in the 
future, same-sex marriage was to be introduced in the Greek law, as well. As I 
mentioned earlier, the rationale of assimilating partners to spouses concerns the 
relationships between the couple and cannot apply, automatically, to the field of 
kinship. Even if same-sex marriage is legally established, the situation in respect of 
medically assisted reproduction will not automatically change. The critical aspect in 
relation to medically assisted procreation issues is not the specific form and 
institutionalization of the personal relationship between assisted individuals, but, on 
the one hand, the legislative determination of the permissibility to use these methods 
and, on the other hand, the establishment of kinship with the child to be born. Indeed, 
it must be stressed that a fundamental element of the rationale behind the legislative 
regulation of medically assisted procreation in Greece is that those two issues are 
inextricably linked, i.e. that the permissibility of medically assisted reproduction must 
be necessarily accompanied by the establishment of a legal parentage for the child to 
be born32. 
In conclusion, it is not enough to adopt legal provisions that will merely 
extend registered partnership or marriage to same-sex couples, in order to resolve the 
legal issues arising in relation to the use of assisted reproduction methods by such 
couples. For instance, it would not suffice to recognize registered partnership between 
two women. The question must be answered as to whether, when one of the women 
gives birth to a child, a “presumption of maternity” is activated in favor of her partner 
or whether another method must be foreseen in order to establish a legal link between 
the child and the mother’s female partner. It would not be enough to say that two men 
                                                          
32 Explanatory Report of Law 3089/2002, point Ι.2. Fountedaki, Human Reproduction, ibid. 141-142. 
See, Kounougeri-Manoledaki, Family Law, ibid. ΙΙ 2. 
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can get married since, in order for them to be able to have a common child, 
amendments must be made both to regulations on surrogacy and to the presumption of 
paternity (given that the child cannot descend biologically from both men). Political 
will and commitment are necessary in order to address these issues, as they shouldn’t 
rely on legal interpretation and ad hoc judicial approaches. 
A last remark: as regards childbearing by same-sex couples using medically 
assisted procreation methods, the interest of the child [Vide Article 1(2) of Law 
3305/200533] is a far weaker argument compared to adoption, in relation to which, as 
is well known, said argument is often used against the establishment of registered 
partnership for same-sex couples: adoption has to do with a real child that should be 
given the most suitable family. Therefore, some argue that adoption by same-sex 
couples is not in the interest of the child, not because these persons are a priori bad 
parents for some reason but because, under the present circumstances, in neo-
conservative Greece, the child’s social integration will be problematic. Regardless of 
the stance we adopt vis-à-vis this argument, things are different for medically assisted 
reproduction: in this case we are attempting to establish the permissibility of creating 
a new life, using the relevant methods, and subsequently regulating the legal status of 
the child, not only on the basis of the child’s biological origin but also on the basis of 
socio-affective kinship34. Therefore, if a child is born, using any method whatsoever, 
it would be contrary to the interest of the child to fail to establish a legal connection 
with the persons who sought the child’s birth and wish to have the child. In addition, 
it would be inappropriate to argue that it is better for a child not to exist than to have, 
for instance, two fathers. 
                                                          
33For a critical review of these provisions and their implementation by the case-law (See, indicatively 
Single-Member Court of First Instance of Katerini 408/2006.Single-Member Court of First Instance of 
Rhodope 400/2007. Single-Member Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki 14946/2010. Single-
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influence of new artificial reproduction methods in the development of the Greek law on kinship, 
Armenopoulos [Hellenic Law Review], 1995, 283 et seq.). See, Androulidaki - Dimitriadi, Legal 
problems arising from artificial reproduction, Nomiko Vima [Hellenic Law Review] 1986, 12. Its 
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Kounougeri - Manoledaki (mainly in Artificial Reproduction and Civil Law: The Draft Law on 
“Medical assistance in human reproduction”, Society of Jurists of Northern Greece, vol. 48, entitled 
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